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Washington DC (Consolidated Press, Nov. 6, 2024) – Bill
Gates has been elected the 47th President of the United States,
narrowly defeating opponent Warren Buffet by slightly fewer
than one billion votes.
Tuesday’s Presidential election was the first since the 2022
Supreme Court decision in Corporations United v. Federal Election
Commission giving corporations the right to vote, on the theory
that corporations are people, too. That decision is credited with
encouraging thousands of citizens to create hundreds or
thousands of shell corporations, controlled by them, for the sole
purpose of voting in yesterday’s election.
The vote tally as of 2 a.m. this morning was approximately
231.7 billion votes for Mr. Gates, with 230.9 billion votes cast in
favor of Mr. Buffet. Several third-party candidates trailed far
behind with fewer than five billion votes each.
Before you dismiss this fanciful scene as a mere dystopic
nightmare, consider this: Since the 14th Amendment first
announced the principle of equal protection under the law for all
“persons,” that clause has been invoked far more often to protect
the rights of corporate entities than for the freed slaves (and their
descendants) for whom the amendment was designed.1 Worse
In 1912, one lawyer conducted a study of all of the cases between 1868 and
1912 which had invoked the Fourteenth Amendment. The study found that, in
the 604 cases which turned on some provision of the Fourteenth Amendment,
only 28 (less than 5%) involved African-Americans, for whose benefit the
amendment had ostensibly been adopted. (In nearly all of those cases, the
racial minorities lost.) Of the remaining cases, 312 (more than half the total)
involved corporations claiming the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment
in order to strike down regulations businesses did not like, including minimum
wage laws, zoning laws, and child labor laws. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE
CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 157-58
(2018).
1

In a related context, a more recent study has shown that corporations have
increasingly asserted First Amendment speech rights in the Supreme Court:
“[n]early half of First Amendment legal challenges now benefit business
corporations and trade groups, rather than other kinds of organizations or
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still, in many of the cases in which African-Americans sought
protection under the 14th Amendment, they were unsuccessful.2
Corporations have gradually won more and more political
rights, including the 2010 decision in Citizens United that gave
them the right to spend unlimited amounts of money on political
speech.3 Now that corporations have the legal authority to
indirectly influence politics, how big of a jump is it, really, to
allow corporations to do directly, through voting, that which they
can now do indirectly?
Of course corporate voting in our elections is a silly idea,
and hopefully (almost surely?) one that will never come to pass.
But to recognize that corporations can be prevented from actual
voting in elections is to recognize that we, the humans who
invented corporations, have the power to limit corporate influence
in human political affairs. Yet the Supreme Court so far has
found it difficult to define where the political rights of
corporations end. The notion that “corporations are people” seems
to have taken such a deep root in the collective mind of the court
that the court has become blind to the damage that metaphor
creates in our political system.4

individuals.” John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment:
History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 224 (2015).
2

WINKLER, supra note 1, at 157-58.

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also cases discussed at infra
notes 27-38.
3

The idea that “money is speech” is equally flawed. It is possible that “money
is speech” is a metonym rather than a metaphor. See infra Part III-a. If “money
is speech” is a metonym, it poses less of a problem because if “money” is merely
a stand-in for the concept of “influence,” money would be easy to regulate.
Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical
Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58
MERCER L. REV. 949, 951 (2007). But if, as many claim, “money is speech” is
treated as a metaphor, it suffers from many of the same problems that
“corporations are people” metaphor does. While the primary focus of this
article is on the “corporations are people” metaphor, I will also address “money
4
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It is possible to take a metaphor too far. Corporations don’t
have the same legal rights as humans in a lot of quintessentially
human ways. For example, nobody would argue that corporations
have the right to marry each other, right?5 Corporations can’t
have children, can they?6 At least they can’t adopt children.7 And
if a corporation gets sick, we wouldn’t provide it governmentsubsidized health care, would we?8 And certainly, being
inherently immortal, corporations cannot have religious beliefs.
Can they?9
If you are in the habit of skipping the footnotes as you read,
may I request that you depart from that habit here and read the
previous four footnotes now? I’ll wait.
The preceding litany is, of course, facetious—but only
barely so.10 It probably is not the case that any of those legal
is speech” from time to time, including a recommendation for a new metaphor
to replace it.
Although we do allow them to merge with each other. We apparently are even
okay with plural marriages for corporations. For example, Chase National
Bank merged with The Manhattan Company in 1955 to form Chase
Manhattan Bank; it then merged with J.P. Morgan & Co. in 2000 to form
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. See J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., in 38
INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF COMPANY HISTORIES 253 (Jay P. Pederson ed.,
St. James Press 2001).
5

6

Well, they can create wholly owned subsidiaries.

7

They can only acquire other corporations and operate them as subsidiaries.

Unless we decide to provide it with a government-funded bailout. See, e.g.,
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765 (2008).
8

Unless they want to assert religious beliefs in order to avoid a law applicable
to everybody else. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682
(2014).
9

For an alternative litany discussing ways in which corporations share
constitutional rights coextensively with humans, and in other contexts have
more limited or no constitutional rights, see Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.:
Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 910-11 (2011).
10
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concepts is expressly based upon the notion that corporations are
people, but each of those concepts are entirely consistent with
that metaphor. And maybe the fact that the metaphor is so
familiar to us means that our guard is down just a bit…and the
principles listed above therefore don’t get carefully examined.
Hobby Lobby gets a pass.
This article begins from the proposition that too much
money in our political system is a bad thing.11 One nonpartisan
group has estimated that total “independent expenditures” on
political campaigns for federal offices totaled $143.7 million in
2008, the election cycle immediately preceding the 2010 Citizens
United decision; that total jumped to $1.4 billion in 2016 (a tenfold increase).12 Most of this money is untraceable; some comes
directly from corporations, while significant amounts come from
individuals. But the sources are hidden because the donations
generally go to corporations qualified as 501(c)(4) “social welfare”
corporations13 that do not disclose the identity of their donors
(these groups are frequently referred to as “dark money” groups).
By “too much money in our political system,” I mean large-dollar donations
by for-profit business corporations designed to influence the election of
candidates. Spending by media corporations (for example, by endorsing certain
candidates on the editorial pages) pose different concerns, which are beyond
the scope of this article. Likewise, “issue advocacy” (spending money to
promote ballot initiatives or create general awareness of issues unrelated to
endorsing specific candidates), whether by for-profit or not-for-profit
corporations, likewise poses a different set of concerns which are beyond the
scope of this article.
11

Of course, the problem of large-dollar donations is not limited to corporate
spending. A number of individual or family foundation donations poses an
equally large risk to the political system, by supplanting the voices of ordinary
citizens with the voices of the ultra-rich. Abandoning the metaphor of “money
is speech” is one way of addressing this related issue.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/reports/citizens_united.php. These numbers
do not include spending on political campaigns for state offices.
12

I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012). Other forms of organization, such as limited
liability companies, can also be used to hide the identity of donors as well.
13
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One nonprofit, nonpartisan group, Issue One, has attempted to
track as many dark money donations as possible.14 Its report,
“Dark Money Illuminated,”15 concludes that just fifteen dark
money groups accounted for more than 75% of the dark money
spent from 2010 to 2016. The report includes a database showing
the names of those dark money organizations and as many of the
individual and corporate donors to those organizations as it could
find.16 Most of the donors listed were large business corporations
or lobbyists funded by them.17
Popular perception is that this spending is harmful;
depending on how the question is asked, anywhere between 75
and 96 percent of citizens polled agree with some version of the
statement that “politicians rely too much on lobbyists/corporate
donations/big money, and do not listen to me.”18 Not everybody

14

ISSUE ONE, https://www.issueone.org/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).

ISSUE ONE, https://www.issueone.org/dark-money/ (last visited Sept. 16,
2018).
15

"Dark Money Illuminated" Issue One Database of Dark Money Donors,
GOOGLE DOCS,
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1vpImNT1tSNoBWpSIg7Hx_gqG85hcM
70CJ_5DtPcIYBI/edit#gid=0 (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
16

For example, Issue One reports that Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America, the lobbying group for major pharmaceutical
companies, provided nearly two thirds of the funding for a 501(c)(4) “social
welfare” organization called Freedom Path. In its first two years, Freedom
Path raised $1.58 million to support the re-election of Utah Sen. Orrin Hatch.
Michael Beckel, Dark Money Illuminated, ISSUE ONE 3-4,
https://www.issueone.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Dark-MoneyIlluminated-Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
17

In 2018, 75% of respondents to a survey by The Center for Public Integrity
(66% of Republicans and 85% of Democrats) supported a constitutional
amendment to overturn Citizens United. The same survey showed that 88% of
all respondents want to reduce the influence of money in politics. Ashley
Balcerzak, Study: Most Americans want to kill ‘Citizens United’ with
constitutional amendment, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 10, 2018, 11:45 AM),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-05-10/study-most-americans-want-killcitizens-united-constitutional-amendment.
18
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agrees with this statement, of course.19 Many of those who
advocate for corporate “free speech” rights do so on the theory
that corporations are “made up of people.”20 Aside from the
In 2017, a stunning 96% of respondents in a Washington Post/University of
Maryland poll ranked “money in politics” as the most significant factor in
“causing dysfunction in the U.S. political system.” In second place was
“wealthy political donors” at 94%. John Wagner & Scott Clement, ‘It’s just
messed up’: Most think political divisions as bad as Vietnam era, new poll
shows, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2017),

www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/democracypoll/?utm_term=.f386213ae5aa.
In 2016, 93% of respondents agreed that “elected officials listen more to deeppocketed donors than regular voters.” Americans Say Money In Politics Is A
Top Five Concern This November, ISSUE ONE, www.issueone.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/issue-one-ipsos-polling-june-2016.pdf (last visited
Aug. 25, 2018). In 2018, 77% of respondents agreed that “there should be limits
on the amount of money individuals and groups can spend on campaigns;” in
that same poll, 74% of respondents agreed that it was “very important” that
large donors to campaigns should not have more political influence than other
people; an additional 16% agreed that it was “somewhat important.” Bradley
Jones, Most Americans want to limit campaign spending, say big donors have
greater political influence, PEW RES. CTR. (May 8, 2018),

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/08/most-americans-want-tolimit-campaign-spending-say-big-donors-have-greater-political-influence/.
See, e.g., David Freddoso, Yes, corporations are people. Get over it., WASH.
EXAMINER (Apr. 5, 2017, 2:33 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/yescorporations-are-people-get-over-it; Carson Holloway, Are Corporations
People?, 41 NAT’L AFFAIRS (Fall 2015),
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/are-corporations-people.
19

See, e.g., Holloway, supra note 19 at 110 (“The rights accorded to the
corporate form, [Blackstone] suggested, were granted in order to encourage
cooperation among individuals with a view to socially useful ends. Without the
corporate form, an association of individuals could not make binding rules to
govern its members or internal structure.”). Former Presidential candidate
Mitt Romney made a similar argument in defense of his infamous comment:
“Corporations are people, my friend.” He followed that assertion up by saying,
“Everything corporations earn ultimately goes to people. Where do you think it
goes?” Philip Rucker, Mitt Romney says ‘corporations are people’, WASH. POST
(Aug. 11, 2011), www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-romney-sayscorporations-arepeople/2011/08/11/gIQABwZ38I_story.html?utm_term=.9fe296bf594f.
20
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problem that this defense does not define what “people” the
corporation speaks for,21 this argument is circular: corporations
are people because a corporation is a group of people.
There are also those who argue that the problem in our
political system is not too much money; it is too little money.
These advocates say that in order to counter large donations from
wealthy individuals and corporations from flooding the political
marketplace with gigantic donations, a better answer would be to
counteract that money with a flood of small-dollar donations. The
recent fundraising successes of candidates like Bernie Sanders22
and Beto O’Rourke23 suggest that this may be a viable route–even
though both of those candidates lost.
Another alternative is public funding of elections. The city
of Seattle, Washington is currently experimenting with
“democracy vouchers,” in which legal residents of the city can
receive a $25 voucher which they can assign to any City Council

21

See discussion infra notes 60-64.

Clare Foran, Bernie Sanders's Big Money, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/bernie-sandersfundraising/471648/. The website Open Secrets reports that Sanders raised
$228,164,501 total, of which $134,669,942 (57.7% of the total) was in donations
under $200 each. Bernie Sanders U.S. Senator From Vermont,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/candidate.php?id=N00000528 (last visited
Jan. 2, 2019).
22

Open Secrets reports that O’Rourke raised $78,979,726 in his unsuccessful
2018 run for the United States Senate. Texas Senate 2018 Race,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary?cycle=2018&id=TXS2 (last visited
Nov. 4, 2019). O’Rourke claimed that the average donation to his campaign
was $47. Amber Phillips, No, Beto O’Rourke’s insane $38 million fundraising
haul does not mean he can win Texas, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2018, 11:37 am),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/12/no-beto-orourkes-insanemillion-fundraising-haul-does-not-mean-he-can-wintexas/?utm_term=.9060ce75577e.
23
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candidate of their choosing.24 Voters approved a property tax to
raise $3 million to support this program; the first election for
which these vouchers will be available to assign to candidates will
be in February, 2019. While interesting, this idea is beyond the
scope of this paper. I must confess, however, to some skepticism
about the idea of democracy vouchers, since to the extent they
depend on tax dollars for funding, they would seem to be
susceptible to manipulation by the political interests that would
have to vote to fund them. And putting more money into the
system through these vouchers would likely just further escalate
the arms war: corporate and wealth interests will always be able
to outspend whatever tax dollars can be put into the hands of
ordinary voters. Simply put, before we could reach a satisfactory
solution through public funding, we would still have to solve the
Citizens United problem. Meaningful campaign finance reform
cannot take place so long as corporations are regarded as people
with political rights equal to human beings, and so long as money
is considered speech.
This article critically examines these two metaphors. It is
part examination of how we got into this situation, and part
thought experiment about how we can get out of it. Part I
summarizes how corporations came to be thought of by the courts
as “people,” and how money came to be thought of as “speech.”
Part II summarizes, and then debunks, the oft-proffered rationale
that “corporate personhood” is merely a legal fiction. It turns out
it is not a proper legal fiction at all; if it were, it would be much
easier to limit the reach of the concept. The “legal fiction” that
corporations are people now serves as a magic wand to endow
corporations with rights they would not otherwise have, and
maybe don’t need in order to fulfill their social purpose.25 Rather
Democracy Voucher Program, SEATTLE.GOV,
https://www.seattle.gov/democracyvoucher/about-the-program (last visited Dec.
27, 2019).
24

One Harvard professor notes that the assertion (and protection) of corporate
speech rights under the First Amendment is a relatively recent phenomenon.
At the time of the founding, and up until the mid-20th Century, corporations
25

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338715
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3316414

Page 10

OF METAPHORS AND MAGIC WANDS

[VOL: X, NNN]

than solving problems, this supposed “legal fiction” instead is
creating new problems. Part III then examines the literature of
metaphor and metonym in the law. It first considers, and rejects,
the notion that “corporations are people” is a metonym, which is a
simple (and less powerful) word substitution. Rather, this section
argues that “corporations are people” is a metaphor which
actually helps transfer human rights into the corporate form.
This section then addresses the question of “why is the metaphor
of corporations are people so powerful and enduring?” While one
thread of modern cognitive psychology suggests that, because
metaphors work at such an unconscious level, they are difficult to
break out of, other scholars more hopefully suggest that through
conscious choice, the human mind is capable of rejecting old
metaphors in favor of newer, more useful ones.
Some scholars argue that “corporations are people” because
they need certain rights, most prominently property rights, in
order to fulfill their legitimate functions.26 Therefore, these
scholars suggest, we need to be wary of departing from that “tried
and true” metaphor. Part IV suggests that a new metaphor—that
“corporations are tools”—would be a more useful way of
protecting the legal rights that are useful to corporations, while

did not have extensive First Amendment rights; yet even without those rights,
they still provided a powerful engine for economic growth. Coates, supra note
1, at 225; but see generally KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO
(AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE IT) 6 (Yale Univ. Press 2018), where the author
argues that corporations do need some (but not all) of the constitutional rights
that humans enjoy, including some speech rights, in order to fulfill their social
purpose.
See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 25, at 2. The provocative title of this
excellent book is somewhat misleading, in that the author documents
throughout the book the ways in which corporate interests may be at odds with
the interests of some of its stakeholders, including employees, customers, and
from time to time even its shareholders. For that reason, the author advocates
for a more limited set of constitutional rights for corporations than those
enjoyed by natural persons. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 25, at 20, 101170.
26
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still denying them human rights such as the right of political
speech.
While the prescription in Part IV suggests that changing
the metaphor would solve the problems created in our politics
when courts granted corporations the same political rights as
human beings, Part V takes a more practical approach. The
Supreme Court is not likely to simply change the metaphor
because scholars demand the change. Part V takes a brief look at
the citizens’ movement across the nation to amend the United
States Constitution to declare that corporations are not people,
thereby overturning the rationale behind Citizens United and the
many other cases, before and after, which depend on the
metaphor. Part V is designed to provide the legal rationale behind
changing the metaphor, and to give advocates in this movement
the ammunition needed to break away from the destructive
metaphors that has led us to the position we now find ourselves
in.
Because metaphors are so familiar to us, so unconscious,
and so visceral, it is easy to put too much faith in them. And
reasoning by inappropriate metaphor (like “corporations are
people”) can lead us to some very strange decisions.
To repurpose and rephrase a common maxim, the
unexamined metaphor is not worth relying on.

I.

How did we get here?

The twin concepts that “corporations are people” and “money is
speech” have developed somewhat independently from each other.
The former has a fairly long history, dating back to the
nineteenth century. The latter is of more recent provenance.

a.

How corporations became people

The corporations-are-people metaphor is often said to trace its
origins back to the Reconstruction-era case, Santa Clara County
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v. Southern Pacific Railroad,27 when a railroad company
complained that its fences were being taxed in a manner different
from fences owned by property owners who were natural persons.
This raised a question of equal protection under the 14th
Amendment, which provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”28
The court reporter’s syllabus reports that
Before argument[,] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE said:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the
question whether the provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State
to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations.
We are all of opinion that it does.29

27

118 U.S. 394 (1886).

28

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

29

Santa Clara County, 118 U.S. at 396.

There is a significant question as to whether this statement is
accurate. When Chief Justice Waite purportedly claimed that “we are all of the
opinion that it does,” that statement can only be true if one of the Associate
Justices had a recent change of heart. In Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F.
Cas. 67 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 7,052), decided just three years after the 14 th
Amendment was ratified, Circuit Judge Woods wrote that
The plain and evident meaning of the [the 14th Amendment] is, that the
persons to whom the equal protection of the law is secured are persons
born or naturalized or endowed with life and liberty, and consequently
natural and not artificial persons. This construction of the section is
strengthened by the history of the submission by congress, and the
adoption by the states of the 14th amendment, so fresh in all minds as
to need no rehearsal.
Id. at 68.
Ten years after writing this opinion, Judge Woods was appointed to the
position of Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court by President
Rutherford B. Hayes. Justice Woods served in that position from January 5,
1881 until his death on May 14, 1887. William B. Woods, OYEZ,
https://www.oyez.org/justices/william_b_woods (last visited Dec. 27, 2019).
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In other words, if the report is accurate, the Supreme Court
assumed (without argument) that corporations are “persons” for
the purpose of its analysis. The actual opinion of the court only
deals with whether the fences were properly taxed by the state (it
concludes they were not).30
Santa Clara County was a case about property rights
under the 14th Amendment, and since corporations are devices for
owning and managing property, perhaps the assumption that
corporations are “persons” is justified for the limited purpose of
deciding that case. My point is not that the case was wrongly
decided; my point is that when lawyers (and courts) cite the case
for the proposition that “corporations are people, too,” they are
misrepresenting the actual holding of the case. That question was
explicitly not argued, nor decided, by the court.31 But as later
courts cited Santa Clara County as authority for the notion that
corporations are people too,32 it turned out that this remark by
He was therefore a serving Associate Justice at the time Santa Clara County
was decided in 1886. Whether he changed his views in the 16 years between
Insurance Company and Santa Clara County is lost to history.
For a fuller description of the history of this headnote, including the
role of Justice Woods and the questionable claim that “we are all of the opinion
that” corporations are people, see WINKLER, supra note 1, at 149-53.
30

Santa Clara County, 118 U.S. at 416-17.

Indeed, the way the court resolved the case made the determination of the
14th Amendment question moot. It concluded that the state had no power to
include fences as part of the “franchise, roadway, road-bed, rails, or rollingstock” (things that the state had legal authority to impose taxes on). Id. at 415.
This resolution of the case does not depend on whether the owner of those
fences was a corporation or not. In that sense, if the Court had made the
observation that it was of the opinion that corporations were entitled to the
protection of the 14th amendment in its opinion, it would have been dicta; the
fact that the observation was only recorded as an aside by the court reporter
makes the observation something less than dicta.
31

See, e.g., Covington & Lexington. Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592
(1896); Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R.R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386, 391
(1892); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 29 (1889);
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205 (1888); Pembina Consol. Silver
Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888). Many lower
32
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the court reporter may have been the first step down what turned
into a very slippery slope, indeed.
In more modern times, the notion that corporations are
people too (with some political speech rights) seems to have
gained a great deal of traction. For example, in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,33 the Supreme Court held that
corporations do have First Amendment protection to speak in
favor of or against ballot initiatives.34 In the 2010 decision of
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the right of
political speech was extended to corporations by permitting them
to provide direct financial support to political candidates.35 It did

courts also quickly cited Santa Clara County as authority for the proposition
that corporations are people too; see, e.g., Cent. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. W. N.C.R. Co.,
89 F. 24, 31-32 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1898); Stockton v. Balt. & N.Y. R.R. Co., 32 F. 9,
13-14 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887); Dugger v. Mechanics & Traders Ins. Co. of New
Orleans, 32 S.W. 5, 6 (Tenn. 1895).
33

435 U.S. 765 (1978).

Discussion of governmental affairs “is the type of speech indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech
comes from a corporation rather than an individual.” Id. at 777 (footnotes
omitted). That case also relied heavily on the metaphor that “money is speech”;
see discussion infra notes 39-49.
34

Professor Greenfield provides a more nuanced analysis:
Corporations should receive those speech rights necessary in order to
achieve their institutional and social role. That is, corporations as a
class of institutional speakers should be able to speak on the questions
that arise about that rule, and individual corporations should be able
to speak on matters that are germane to their own business. The
further afield a corporation roams from those areas of focus, the less
persuasive its claim to First Amendment protection will become.
GREENFIELD, supra note 25, at 135. He then examines specific ways in which
the speech rights of corporate speakers should differ from those of natural
persons. Id.
558 U.S. 310 (2010). This has to be the most ironically named case in modern
constitutional law. The case does not protect the rights of citizens, united or
otherwise. Instead, it stands for the proposition that corporations now have the
35
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so by overturning several prior Supreme Court cases and major
portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act
(commonly known as the McCain-Feingold Act). The court found
“no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political
speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain
disfavored speakers.”36
Citizens United was not the last decision to extend First
Amendment rights to corporations. In 2012, in a per curiam
opinion citing only Citizens United, the Supreme Court
invalidated a Montana statute prohibiting corporations from
making any “expenditure in connection with a candidate . . . that
supports or opposes a candidate or political party.”37 And, in an
even broader win for corporate political rights, in 2014 the Court
held that closely-held, for-profit corporations may assert religious
freedom claims under the First Amendment.38

b.

How money became speech

The notion that “money is speech” is frequently traced to the case,
Buckley v. Valeo.39 In Buckley, the Court was faced with a
challenge to Watergate-era reforms contained in the Federal
right to spend unlimited amounts of money in direct advocacy for or against
candidates for political office.
36

Id. at 341.

Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516, 516 (2012) (holding with
a 5 Justice majority and a 4 Justice dissent) (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35227(1) (2011)).
37

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). Note, however,
that the argument of the store in this case is incoherent: it actually sought to
disregard the corporate form in order to assert the religious freedom of the
shareholders. See GREENFIELD, supra note 25, at 10-11. The majority opinion
in Hobby Lobby did not take account of this inconsistency.
38

424 U.S. 1 (1976). One of the first commenters to use the term “money is
speech” was Judge J. Skelly Wright of the D.C. Circuit. See J. Skelly Wright,
Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L. J. 1001, 1005
(1976) (criticizing the Buckley decision in its treatment of money as the
equivalent of speech).
39
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Election Campaign Act. That Act had placed limits on individual
donations to candidates; limits on the aggregate amount an
individual could donate annually on campaign donations; limits
on the amount of money individual candidates could donate to
their own campaigns; and imposed certain reporting
requirements.40 The Act also created the Federal Elections
Commission. A group of candidates and political parties
challenged the law as violative of their right of free speech under
the First Amendment.41 The Court upheld the limitation on
contributions to individual candidates but struck down the
limitations on aggregate spending and spending by candidates on
their own behalf as violative of the First Amendment.42
Cases decided since 1976 have reinforced the notion that
money is speech. For example, in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,43 two national banks challenged a Massachusetts statute
which barred contributions or expenditures by corporations “for
the purpose of . . . influencing or affecting the vote on any
question submitted to the voters, other than one materially
affecting any of the property, business or assets of the

40

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13.

41

Id. at 7-8.

Id. at 143-44. Judge J. Skelly Wright, however, points out that this
conclusion is not inevitable, and in fact may be counterintuitive:
42

[F]ar from stifling First Amendment values, [the Federal Election
Campaign Act] actually promotes them. The ceilings on giving and
spending take from wealthy citizens, candidates, and organizations
only certain limited political advantages totally unrelated to the merits
of their arguments—advantages which all too frequently obscure the
merits of the arguments. In place of unlimited spending, the law
encourages all to emphasize less expensive face-to-face communications
efforts, exactly the kinds of activities that promote real dialogue on the
merits and leave much less room for manipulation and avoidance of the
issues.
Wright, supra note 39, at 1019 (footnote omitted).
43

435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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corporation.”44 The banks wished to spend money to express their
views on a ballot initiative regarding a graduated income tax on
individuals in the state.45
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts framed the
question presented as whether corporations have First
Amendment rights (essentially a challenge to the “corporations
are people” metaphor).46 The Supreme Court, however, reframed
the question as whether the Massachusetts statute “abridges
expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect.”47 To
the extent that the “expression” at issue in the case was the
expenditure of money, the reframed question essentially asked
whether money was protected speech. The Court held that it
was.48
The “money is speech” concept seems to have passed into
the received wisdom of the Court and is oft-repeated without any
serious re-examination.49

44

Id. at 768.

45

Id. at 769.

First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Att’y Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1269 (Mass. 1977)
rev’d sub nom. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
(“[B]efore we consider the plaintiffs' various claims, we must first consider
whether and to what extent corporations possess First Amendment rights.”).
46

47

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.

48

Id.

See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“Section 441b’s
prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech. As
a ‘restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign,’ that statute ‘necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth
of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.’ Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam). Were the Court to uphold these restrictions,
the Government could repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of the
various points in the speech process.”).
49
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II. “Corporations are people” is not a proper
legal fiction
The idea that “corporations are people” is frequently rationalized
as a “legal fiction.”50 Blackstone described “legal fictions” in this
way:
[F]ictions of law, though at first they may startle the
student, [are] highly beneficial and useful: especially as
this maxim is ever invariably observed, that no fiction can
extend to work an injury; it[s] proper function being to
prevent a mischief, or remedy an inconvenience, that might
result from the general rule of law.51
One might ask, what “mischief” or “inconvenience” is being solved
by granting corporations the right of political speech? Or does
extending the “legal fiction” that far “work an injury?”52
See, e.g., Agley v. Tracy, 719 N.E.2d 951, 954 (Ohio 1999) (“A corporation is
an entity separate and apart from the individuals who compose it; it is a legal
fiction for the purpose of doing business.”) (emphasis in original); Ashley v.
Ashley, 393 A.2d 637, 641 (Pa. 1978) (“This legal fiction of a separate corporate
entity was designed to serve convenience and justice.”); Bruun v. Cook, 273
N.W. 774, 779 (Mich. 1937). Some judges also acknowledge the limits of this
fiction. For example, Justice Stevens has pointed out that “[c]orporations . . .
and their ‘personhood’ often serve[] as a useful legal fiction. But they are not
themselves members of ‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our
Constitution was established.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 466
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50

3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *43. The notion that a legal fiction
cannot “extend to work an injury” has a long lineage in English law. Lord
Mansfield held that:
51

Fictions of law hold only in respect to the ends and purposes for which
they were invented. When they are urged to an intent and purpose not
within the reason and policy of the fiction, the other party may show
the truth.
Morris v. Pugh and Harwood, 3 Burr. 124, 1243, 97 Eng. Rep. 811 (KB 1761).
Courts will disregard the “corporate fiction” when that form is used to
perpetrate fraud, commit crimes, or in other circumstances. See, e.g., SSP
Partners. v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 454 (Tex. 2008).
52
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The Supreme Court has described legal fictions as devices
designed to “accomplish justice.”53 But courts decline to extend
legal fictions beyond their original purposes.54 A legal fiction is
designed to correct a discrete problem, and no more. It is
essentially a “little white lie.”
Prof. Lon Fuller defined a legal fiction as “either, (1) a
statement propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of
its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility.”55
But my claim here is broader: even where the problem is neither fraudulent
nor criminal (as in the case of electioneering expenditures), where the legal
fiction creates “mischief” or an “inconvenience” (rather than prevent either of
those things), the fiction is not doing what it was intended to do.
See, e.g., Johnston v. Jones, 66 U.S. 209, 221 (1861) (“[The doctrine of
relation] is a legal fiction, invented to promote the ends of justice. It is a
general rule, that it shall do no wrong to strangers. It is applied with vigor
between the original parties, when justice so requires; but it is never allowed to
defeat the collateral rights of third persons, lawfully acquired.”); accord U.S.
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Woolridge, 268 U.S. 234, 238 (1925); Kendall v. Ewert, 259
U.S. 139, 148 (1922).
53

See, e.g., S. Nat’l Bank of N.C. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 329, 333 (4th
Cir. 1989) (“The legal fiction that property is located at the owner's domicile
might be appropriate for taxation and similar purposes, but it is inappropriate
to apply it in interpreting the blanket bond's ‘on premises’ proviso. . . . Legal
fictions developed for other purposes simply have no relevance.”); In re Jones,
396 B.R. 638, 646 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008) (“Whether a forgiven debt qualifies
as gross income for federal tax law purposes is not affected by the legal fiction
that the obligation is treated as satisfied under applicable state law.”); In re
Chalasani, 92 F.3d 1300, 1304 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Our condemnation of the use of
legal fictions here—despite the established pedigree of one of them—is that
this action effectively nullified one of the principal purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code: allowing the debtor to begin a new life free from debt.”) (citation
omitted); U.S. v. An Article of Drug Consisting of 4,680 Pails, 725 F.2d 976,
982 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e have dispensed with strict application of this in rem
rule when a legal fiction which exists solely to effectuate the adjudication of
disputes is invoked for the opposite purpose . . . .”).
54

Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 369 (1930). He also points
out that “a fiction is distinguished from a lie by the fact that it is not intended
to deceive.” Id. at 367. More recent scholars acknowledge that nobody since has
come up with a better definition. See Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions,
20 GA. L. REV. 871, 875-876 (1986).
55
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Since everybody understands that corporations are not literally
people, only the second alternative definition really fits here: the
claim that “corporations are people” is a clearly false statement
that has utility. The question, therefore, collapses down to just
this: “utility” to do what, exactly?
Some scholars have argued that the idea of “corporate
personhood” is undertheorized. Prof. Miller traces the history of
the theory through three phases: (a) artificial entity (i.e
corporations are creations of the state and therefore can be
controlled and limited by the states), (b) real entity (corporations
have real existence separate and apart from the humans which
created them, and therefore have rights separate and apart from
their creators), and (c) aggregate entity theory (corporations are
groups of people and therefore have the same rights as individual
people).56 Yet these categories are sometimes used
interchangeably and without rigor.57
56

Miller, supra note 10, at 914-31; see also Berger, supra note 4, at 960-62.

Note that while the “artificial entity” and “real entity” theories are mutually
exclusive (a corporation can be one or the other, not both), the “real entity” and
“aggregate entity” theories are not mutually exclusive. That is, either can
justify the granting of constitutional rights to corporations, and are sometimes
offered as alternative explanations for those grants.
There are other paradigms through which one might conceptualize the
existence of corporations. Professor Joseph Morrissey distinguishes between
the “state entity” and “contractarian” views of corporate existence in his
analysis and critiques of the Citizens United decision. Joseph F. Morrissey, A
Contractarian Critique of Citizens United, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 765 (2013).
The “state entity” view is essentially the “artificial entity” view described by
Professor Miller: the corporation is a grantee of rights conferred by the state,
and therefore subject to state control. Id. at 807. The “contractarian” view sees
the corporation as a “nexus or a hub of privately structured contractual
arrangements among all of [the] constituents” of the corporation, including the
“shareholders, managers, customers, suppliers, employees, service providers,
creditors, and even arguably the community within which the corporation is
located.” Id. at 811. This view seems congruent with the “aggregate entity”
theory described by Professor Miller.
For example, Drew Isler Grossman points out that in his dissent in Citizens
United, Justice Stevens alternatively relied on all three theories of corporate
57
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If corporations are artificial entities, then “corporations are
people” can only be understood as an example of Fuller’s second
definition of “legal fiction”: a false statement that is useful for
some limited purpose. The same is true for the notion that
corporations are real (albeit abstract) entities with real rights; we
still understand that corporations are not literally people, but
that fiction becomes a useful device for understanding the nature
of the rights enjoyed by the abstract entity.
But the aggregate entity theory of corporate existence
seems like an example of Fuller’s first definition of “legal fiction”;
that is, a statement propounded with complete (or at least
partial) ignorance of its falsity. The falseness arises from a
disregard of the purposes for which corporations are formed. A
corporation is really just a device to allow the accumulation of
large amounts of capital, to accomplish purposes that individuals
most often cannot accomplish on their own. In its purest form, a
corporation consists of shareholders who agree to pool their
resources in order to engage in economic activity. The legal
principle that allows for this to occur—limited liability by the
shareholders—often divorces the corporate entity from the social
goals that shareholders might have.58 If the purpose of the
existence. Drew Isler Grossman, Note, Would a Corporate “Death Penalty” Be
Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 25 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 697, 707
(2016).
58

As Professor Greenfield explained:
Corporations have asserted rights vis-a-vis the public in order to
benefit the corporation narrowly, seemingly contrary to the public
interest. And when corporations participate in the political sphere,
their resources are brought to bear disproportionately to benefit the
affluent classes, from with their management and prominent
shareholders spring. Corporate treasuries—the product of
contributions by all stakeholders—are used to fight on behalf of the
managerial and financial elite and against others who contribute to the
companies’ success. Corporate money is often used to fight against
minimum-wage increases, workplace safety regulations, consumer
protections, and government initiatives to retard global warming.

GREENFIELD, supra note 25, at 179.
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corporation is to make money for the shareholders, without
making the shareholders liable for how that money is made, the
corporation is free to engage in activities that an individual
shareholder might find morally repugnant (replacing human
workers with robots, for example). And making money is a very
different thing from political speech. Political beliefs are
normative—they reflect the moral values of the individual.
Corporations have no morals, beyond the imperative to make
money for the shareholders.59
Or, stated another way, who is to say what the
“aggregation of people” who form the corporation want? And what
“aggregation of people” count? Are we to examine the
shareholders as the aggregation? If so, we have to make some
pretty tenuous assumptions about whether the shareholders are
really paying much attention at all, given that so many shares
are held by mutual funds or other investment managers on behalf
of other investors;60 that is, the actual people who receive the
dividends are pretty distantly removed from understanding, or
even caring, about how the corporation makes its money.61
Or should we look at the employees of the corporation as
the aggregation of people whose voice is supposedly lifted up by
“[M]any corporate lawyers will tell you that ‘[shareholder] rights are so
limited as to be almost nonexistent,’ given the internal authority wielded by
boards and managers and the expansive protections afforded by the business
judgment rule.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 477 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
59

Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor? 95 VA. L. REV. 1105,
1105 (2009) (“[R]ecent New York Stock Exchange . . . data reveal that trades by
individual investors represent, on average, less than 2% of NYSE trading
volume for NYSE-listed firms. There is no question that U.S. securities
markets are now dominated by institutional investors.”) (footnote omitted).
60

See, e.g., Peter V. Letsou, Shareholder Voice and the Market for Corporate
Control, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 755 (1992); see also Daniel J. H. Greenwood,
Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1049
(1998) (“Not all shareholders live within breathing distance of the polluting
smokestack, and some of the distant ones will not care about pollution that
does not affect them directly.”).
61
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corporate speech? That seems even more unlikely than that the
corporation speaks for the shareholders, since the employees are
by and large viewed as an expense to the corporation. If a
corporation can make more money by paying its workers less, or
by replacing them with robots and machines, the corporation’s
focus on the bottom line puts it at direct odds with the workers.
Surely, the workers cannot be the aggregation of people which
this theory of corporate personhood supposedly protects.62
We are thus left with the management—the “C suite”—as
the supposed aggregation of people to whom this theory likely
refers. But their interest in increasing their income cuts against
both the interest of the shareholders in receiving dividends63 and
the interest of the workers in receiving continued employment
and higher wages. In short, given the many diverging interests
among the people with an interest in the corporation, it is
literally impossible for the corporation to discern what any
“aggregation of people” really wants. They all want many things,
inherently conflicting with each other.64

It should be noted that ordinary political action committees (PACs) do not
suffer from this problem. PACs, funded by voluntary donations from a group of
like-minded individuals, for the express purpose of aggregating funds to make
contributions to political candidates who share their values, should not be
considered “dark” money. PACs are subject to robust disclosure rules, and
there is no ambiguity about what they stand for. So-called “SuperPACs,” which
go to great lengths to hide their donors (often using the device of a non-profit
501(c)(4) corporation), should be abolished or heavily regulated.
62

“[T]he investor might be lured into the investment, hoping for profits, while
unwittingly supporting political candidates that are unacceptable to that
investor.” Morrissey, supra n. 56, at 820. Professor Morrissey also debunks the
notion that political contributions somehow enhance the profitability of
corporations, noting that “recent studies have concluded that corporations have
not been able to show a positive correlation between support for political
candidates and profitability.” Id. at 821 (citing studies that show corporate
political spending correlates more strongly with lower profits).
63

For a more thorough discussion of the problems inherent in determining who
is “speaking” when a corporation engages in political speech, see Greenwood,
supra note 61, at 1021-1049.
64
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So the corporation really cannot be a legal fiction in the
sense that it is an aggregation of people wanting to speak (there
are too many discordant voices that want to be heard). We are
then left with the mutually exclusive possibilities that the
corporation is an artificial entity, or a real one.
If the corporation is an artificial entity (an abstraction
created by the state), then by definition its charter can be limited
by the entity which created it. This view is archaic, having been
the dominant theory of corporate existence only from the
Founding to the mid-nineteenth century.65 The more modern view
is that corporations are real entities with their own set of rights,
independent of the humans who created them. Professor Miller
writes that the “real entity theory” helped solve a number of
conceptual problems with the expansion of corporations in the
late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries:
Conceptualizing the corporation as a real
entity, separate from its owners, helped resolve the
second interpretive problem: the fact that a
corporation assumed the liability of its owners for
debts and torts. Because courts came to treat the
corporation as a separate entity, it meant that the
corporation, not the individual owners, was liable
for breach of its duties. But the flipside of duty is
right. Therefore, in the same way the corporation

Miller, supra note 10, at 916. The Wyoming Constitution, drafted during
that era, reflects this view:
65

All powers and franchises of corporations are derived from the people
and are granted by their agent, the government, for the public good
and general welfare, and the right and duty of the state to control and
regulate them for these purposes is hereby declared. The power, rights
and privileges of any and all corporations may be forfeited by willful
neglect or abuse thereof. The police power of the state is supreme over
all corporations as well as individuals.
WYOMING CONST., art. X, § 2 (adopted 1889).
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came to have duties independent of its owners, it
also came to have rights independent of them.66
It is the “real entity” theory that underlies the Citizens
United decision: the corporation is viewed as a “disfavored
speaker” which has been deprived of the right of engaging in
“political speech.”67
In sum, the notion that “corporations are people” may have
begun as a proper legal fiction: it was an idea with utility in
solving problems of property management. But a legal fiction
should only be used to solve problems. The recent incarnation of
“corporations are people” into real entity theory (i.e. giving
corporations rights heretofore only granted to real people) goes
beyond the need to solve property management issues and creates
problems, rather than solving them. The idea that corporations
are people too, is no longer the “little white lie” of a legal fiction; it
has become a magic wand to create rights where none previously
existed.

III. Metaphor or metonym?
If “corporations are people” is not a legal fiction, what is it?
Two linguistic devices offer themselves as alternatives: it could be
either metaphor or metonym.

a.

The metonym of money as speech

Professor Linda Berger points out that the protection of
corporate money as speech protected by the First Amendment
requires three separate metaphors working together: (1)
corporations are people, (2) money is speech, and (3) speaking is a

66

Miller, supra note 10, at 923 (footnotes omitted).

67

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010).
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“marketplace of ideas.”68 “With those metaphors mapping the
way, corporate money talks, and it is protected speech.”69
But she also points out an apparent anomaly in that
formulation. If, instead of a metaphor, money is taken to be a
metonym for the concept of attempts to influence elections, the
result changes. Money is then portrayed as evil, a source of
temptation, or corrupting, and therefore is a proper subject for
regulation.70 “Speech in the metaphorical market deserves
protection; money in metonymical isolation requires regulation.”71
A metaphor uses one concept to explain a phenomenon in a
different domain (using the process of “mapping”),72 while a
metonym uses a word as a stand-in for a different concept (no
mapping needed). “Metonymy involves understanding one thing
in terms of something else that is closely related to it, such as
part for whole or producer for product . . . .”73 Professor Steven
Pinker gives the example, “Suzie is parked out back.”74 Obviously,
the name “Suzie” is a stand-in for Suzie’s vehicle; no one actually
thinks Suzie herself is stuck out back in the parking lot. Nor are
Suzie’s rights transferred, or “mapped,” to her vehicle; conversely
the characteristics of Suzie’s vehicle are not imputed to Suzie
herself.
The idea of “corporations are people” as a metonym can
therefore be dismissed fairly easily. Mapping is clearly happening
in the “corporations are people” construct. The rights and
68

Berger, supra note 4, at 950.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 951.

72

See discussion infra at notes 75-86.

ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NARRATIVE THEORY 307 (David Herman et al.,
eds., 2010).
73

STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO
HUMAN NATURE 112 (2007).
74
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characteristics of human beings are being mapped on to the
artificial entity called a “corporation.” That is the work of
metaphor. But what about the “money is speech” piece? Has
money become synonymous with “influence,” such that mapping
is not needed?
Viewing money as a metonym instead of a metaphor would
allow the government to regulate it, as Professor Berger points
out; “money is the root of all evil” seems to cry out for regulation.
But if “money talks”—that is, “money is speech” is viewed as a
metaphor rather than a metonym—then we still have a problem,
since the impulse to protect speech will be mapped onto money.

b.

The power of metaphor

Metaphors are powerful things. Professor Linda Berger describes
metaphor and analogy as the “sun and the moon of legal
persuasion.”75 Linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark
Johnson are probably the most well-known scholars who study
the impact of metaphors on the way we think.76 They developed
the theory of the “conceptual metaphor,” a linking of one concept
to another at such a subconscious level that the person employing
the metaphor does not even perceive the metaphor. For example,
most of us use metaphors such as “more is up” (“my income rose
this year when I got that promotion”), or “love is a journey”
(“where are we going in this relationship?”), without consciously
understanding that we are using a metaphor.77
But the very power of metaphors also makes them
dangerous. Amos Tversky, one of the fathers of the modern
discipline of cognitive psychology, once told the audience at a
Linda L. Berger, Metaphor and Analogy: The Sun and Moon of Legal
Persuasion, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 147, 147 (2013).
75

See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY
(1980). Their groundbreaking work in 1980 is often credited with being the
foundation of the entire discipline of cognitive psychology.
76

77

Id. at 15-16, 44.
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conference at the University of Illinois: “Because metaphors are
vivid and memorable, and because they are not readily subjected
to critical analysis, they can have considerable impact on human
judgment, even when they are inappropriate, useless, or
misleading. . . . They replace genuine uncertainty about the world
with semantic ambiguity. A metaphor is a cover-up.”78
Lakoff and Johnson agree:
The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend
one aspect of a concept in terms of another . . . will
necessarily hide other aspects of the concept. In
allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept . . . a
metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on
other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with
that metaphor.79
This phenomenon is called “hiding.”80
Much has been written about the use of metaphor in legal
reasoning and persuasion.81 Many scholars, in addition to judges,
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE UNDOING PROJECT: A FRIENDSHIP THAT CHANGED OUR
MINDS 316 (2017) (quoting Amos Tversky’s statements from the University of
Illinois’s conference about metaphorical thinking) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Cf. Greenwood, supra note 61, at 1020 (discussing Justice Powell’s
opinion in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
Greenwood also noted: “Speech, not speakers, . . . is what is protected. Thus,
one need not consider the speaker at all: we are relieved of that obligation of
thought.” Id.
78

79

LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 10.

See id. at 10-11. See also Amy E. Sloan & Colin Starger, New Wine in Old
Wineskins: Metaphor and Legal Research, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 1, 8
(2016) (“[W]hen our conceptual metaphors become outmoded, hiding can
inhibit and constrain our thinking without our ever realizing it. In situations
where conceptual change is needed to catch up with events on the ground,
hidden metaphors potentially calcify thinking and stifle innovation.”).
80

See generally Berger, supra note 4; Linda L. Berger, What is the sound of a
corporation speaking? How the cognitive theory of metaphor can help lawyers
shape the law, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169, 170 (2004); J.
Christopher Rideout, Penumbral Thinking Revisited: Metaphor in Legal
81
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have recognized that because metaphors are so powerful, they
have the potential to be misused.82 Judge Cardozo once wrote in
an opinion that “[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched,
for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it.”83
Professor Berger writes that “[i]n cognitive theory,
metaphor is not only a way of seeing or saying; it is a way of
thinking and knowing, the method by which we structure and
reason, and it is fundamental, not ornamental.”84 In addition, she
Argumentation, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 155 (2010); David T.
Ritchie, The Centrality of Metaphor in Legal Analysis and Communication: An
Introduction, 58 MERCER L. REV. 839 (2007); Jeanne L. Schroeder & David
Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Right and the Essence of Wrong: Metaphor
and Metonymy in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2481, 2515 (2003); Michael R.
Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58 MERCER L. REV. 919
(2007); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Just Say “No Fishing”: The Lure of Metaphor,
40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2006); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension
of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2225 (1989); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 81, at 1 (“In the legal setting, reliance on [a]
metaphor can act as a substitute for rigorous analysis, disguising the factors
that influence the result in a case. At best, it is uninformative. Worse, the . . .
metaphor may itself shape the court's attitude toward the issue or claim in a
lawsuit.”).
82

83

Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).

Berger, What is the sound of a corporation speaking?, supra note 81, at 170.
She based this conclusion on the work of Lakoff and Johnson. See e.g., LAKOFF
& JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 3 (noting Lakoff and Johnson first developed the
theory of the “conceptual metaphor”):
84

Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the
rhetorical flourish—a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary
language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of
language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For
this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without
metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive
in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our
ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is
fundamentally metaphorical in nature.
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writes that “[a]s metaphor helps us understand the unfamiliar
concept, it also shapes our thoughts about the new concept
because it maps on top of the new experience the structures,
inferences, and reasoning methods of the old.”85 Metaphor is
powerful because “[w]hat we ‘know’ from experience is believed
more deeply than anything we learn by listening or reading.
Metaphor is persuasive because it draws on tacit knowledge that
has been embedded through unavoidable and repeated
experience.”86
But simply observing that metaphors are powerful things
does not help us understand how to break free from that power,
especially when the metaphor has led to poor results. Why is it
that metaphors enslave thought, and are so hard to escape?
Perhaps the theory of OODA loops can provide a possible
explanation.87

c.
Breaking free from bad metaphors: The
theory of OODA
OODA, originally conceived for military strategy,88 is a useful tool
for analyzing the process through which any decision is made,
from mundane problems to highly complex and consequential
ones.89 OODA stands for:
Berger, supra note 4, at 955 (citing I.A. RICHARDS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RHETORIC 92-94 (1936)).
85

Berger, What is the sound of a corporation speaking?, supra note 81, at 176177 (citing GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE
EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 59 (1999)).
86

Thanks to Todd Jagger of Wolf-PAC for showing me the power of OODA as
an analytical tool.
87

ROBERT CORAM, BOYD: THE FIGHTER PILOT WHO CHANGED THE ART OF WAR
334-35 (2002).
88

This is not the first law review article to discuss the OODA loop. See, e.g.,
Thompson Chengeta, Defining the Emerging Notion of “Meaningful Human
Control” in Weapon Systems, 49 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 833 (2017) (discussing
the relative roles of humans and machines in the OODA cycle); Brandon
89
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Observe (detect the problem to be solved)
Orient (gather relevant data needed to solve the problem)
Decide (process the data according to logical and/or
emotional reasoning)
Act (implement the answer which results from the Decide
process)
The OODA process is cyclical; that is, it occurs in one or
more sequential loops. The Action you take at the end of the
process has an effect on the problem you are trying to solve. Once
you Act, you must then Observe again to determine if your action
(a) solved your problem, (b) did not solve the problem, or (c) solved
the original problem but created a new problem to be solved. If
the outcome was either (b) or (c), you must Orient yourself to the
changed condition and repeat the process.
Note also that the Observe and Orient steps must be
complete and accurate in order to reach a good decision. If you fail
to observe the problem correctly (e.g., you fail to spot the correct
issue in a case), or do not orient yourself correctly by conducting
thorough and effective research, you will not solve the problem.
Every legal problem requires a series of OODA processes to
resolve them. A judge Observes: a defendant has filed a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss the case, and I must decide it. She Orients
herself: she reads the complaint; reads the motion to dismiss; and
reads the briefs filed by the parties; she also does her own
Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211
(2017) (discussing the OODA loop in the context of police tactics); Alan L.
Schuller, At the Crossroads of Control: The Intersection of Artificial Intelligence
in Autonomous Weapon Systems with International Humanitarian Law, 8
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 379 (2017) (discussing problems when some phase of the
OODA process is given to machines); Jeffrey L. Vagle, Tightening the OODA
Loop: Police Militarization, Race, and Algorithmic Surveillance, 22 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 101 (2016) (discussing OODA in the context of military automated
surveillance systems and techniques by civilian police departments). It is,
however, one of the first articles to extend the OODA principle beyond the law
of war or military-or police-related decision processes.
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research to fill in any gaps or to check the veracity of the claims
made by the parties; and other activities. She then processes all of
that information to Decide: motion denied. She Acts by writing an
order and opinion explaining her decision.
And that act affects the lawsuit by allowing it to go
forward. It creates a series of new problems to be solved: the
parties will now engage in discovery, which could lead to more
disputes for the court to decide. There could be a motion for
summary judgment; a motions in limine or other motions to
decide before trial. There could even be a trial. Every stage of the
proceeding will require another OODA process, and the decision
in each step will affect future behavior of the parties or create
new problems to be solved.
It is not just lawsuits that use an OODA loop process. The
law itself develops via an endless OODA loop; this is how the
common law grows. Appellate Court A must decide an appeal. It
Observes the issue or issues presented. It Orients itself by
reading the record, reading the briefs of the parties, and
conducting its own research. It Decides the case by applying the
rules it has discovered during the orientation phase; critically, the
rule of stare decisis guides the court to decide this case
consistently with precedent cases. It then Acts by issuing an
opinion and order.
And we now come to the crux of the problem: the decision
of Appellate Court A becomes a part of the body of law that
Appellate Court B will likely take into account when the next case
presenting the same or similar issues arrives. Appellate Court B
uses a new OODA process to decide that case, which then
becomes part of the body of law that Appellate Court C must take
account of, and the common law (or interpretations of statutory
law) grows and changes incrementally. But if Appellate Courts B,
C and beyond do not adequately Observe the new problems
created by the Act of the previous court, then the new OODA
cycle goes off course, and each new Decision and Act compound
the undetected problem of the preceding courts.
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This is how corporations came to be endowed with the right
of political speech. It began innocently enough, by giving
corporations some rights possessed by natural humans in order to
allow them to serve the functions for which they were created.
Then, through a long series of decisions spanning more than 200
years, corporations gradually gained more and more rights, small
increment by small increment, to the point where courts now
expressly grant corporations the right of political speech.90 No
court seemed to notice the inexorable accumulation of political
power in already-powerful institutions, and how that power has
diminished the voices of average human beings.
To some extent, this short-sightedness is baked into the
doctrine of stare decisis. Under this doctrine, courts are supposed
to decide each new case consistently with previous cases, deciding
no more than necessary to resolve the immediate case before it.91
Departures from precedent are supposed to be rare.92
Another reason for this short-sightedness may be the
power of metaphor itself. As discussed in Part III-B,93 metaphors
are powerful; they can substitute for critical thinking and hide

For an excellent and well-documented examination of the entire 200-year
process through which corporations gained their “civil rights,” see generally
WINKLER, supra note 1.
90

See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
450 (2008) (“courts should neither ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it’ nor ‘formulate a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’”)
(internal quotation marks omitted). But note that the majority in Citizens
United arguably did not adhere to that principle. See Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 405-406 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. D.E.A., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004))
(“[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.”).
91

Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (“Although adherence to
precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from
the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.”).
92

93

See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
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new insights.94 Metaphors can interfere with the re-Observation
by hiding the effects of the preceding Act[ion].
But courts do, on rare occasions, overrule previous cases
and make major changes in legal doctrine. It is well past time for
the Supreme Court to make a fresh Observation: there is a
serious and systemic problem with large business corporations
having political speech rights.95 Much like a dystopic science
fiction movie in which machines with artificial intelligence take
over the world, massive, inanimate, artificial corporations are
imposing their political preferences on the human beings which
created them.

b.

Rethinking the metaphors

So when the Supreme Court gets stuck in the twin
metaphors that corporations are people and money is speech, are
we doomed to a life of corporatocracy?
Psychology professor Stephen Pinker acknowledges the
significant contributions that Lakoff and Johnson have made in
showing the significance of conceptual metaphors to our process
of reasoning. But he insists that Lakoff and Johnson “take[] the
idea a wee bit too far.”96 He points out that because people don’t
even recognize many of the conceptual metaphors they use, they
can easily transcend them. For example, the concept of a “can of
worms” is a conceptual metaphor for “a profusion of problems.”
See LEWIS, supra note 78, at 316 and accompanying text (recalling Amos
Tversky’s observation that “[a] metaphor is a cover-up.”).
94

See GREENFIELD, supra note 25, at 23 (“The billions of dollars flooding the
electoral process skew it—and the legislative process that follows—toward the
moneyed and well-heeled. And the constant search for financial resources by
candidates and elected officials perverts the nature of public service. The Court
has been so enamored with a simplistic, libertarian theory of free speech
doctrine that it is blind to those risks.”) Later, he argues: “A constitutional
amendment is not required to get rid of . . . Citizens United. All that is required
is a court more sophisticated in its understanding of free speech and less
obtuse about the real-life implications of money in politics.” Id. at 112.
95

96

PINKER, supra note 74, at 247.
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People don’t actually visualize a can full of worms when they hear
the expression; they intuitively understand that the speaker is
referring to a profusion of problems.97 Thus,
[p]eople not only can ignore metaphors, but can
question and discount them, and analyze which
aspects are applicable and which should be ignored.
Indeed, calling attention to conventional metaphors
is a common genre of humor, as when Steven Wright
asked, “If all the world’s a stage, where is the
audience sitting?”98
If Pinker is correct, we can have some hope that the
Supreme Court can reason its way out of the metaphor that
corporations are people.99 So let’s do the critical analysis of the

97

Id. at 248.

98

Id. at 249.

There are, of course, examples where courts do ultimately reject bad
metaphors and overrule the precedents that flow from those metaphors. For
example, from the earliest stages of our common law until the mid-20th
century, every state adhered to some form of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. The concept was derived from the notion that “[t]he king can do no
wrong,” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *238. That formulation
depends on the metaphor of “government is a king.” Kings, in medieval
Europe, were thought to have derived their power directly from God, so it
seemed inappropriate to enable somebody to sue God. Id. at 242-243 (“[The
king] owes no kind of subjection to any other potentate on earth. Hence it is,
that no suit or action can be brought against the king, even in civil matters,
because no court can have jurisdiction over him[,] [f]or all jurisdiction implies
superiority of power. . . .”); see also JOHN N. FIGGIS, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF
KINGS 5-6 (2d ed. 1914). Ultimately, states began to see the injustice forced
upon individuals injured by the acts of very human governments, so they
rejected the government-is-king metaphor and began to allow people to sue
their very human governments under certain conditions. See, e.g., David W.
Case, From Pruett to Presley: The Long and Winding Road to Abrogation of
Common Law Sovereign Immunity in Mississippi, 63 MISS. L.J. 537 (1994); see
also Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (according to
Professor Case, id. at 542, this was the first case to abrogate common law state
sovereign immunity from torts).
99
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“corporations are people” metaphor for a moment, to discover
which aspects of the metaphor should be ignored.
To non-lawyers, it is obvious that corporations are not
people at all. Unlike human people, corporations live forever,
even after their human founders die. They feel no pain. They
don’t require clean air or water in order to thrive. They don’t
appreciate beauty or aesthetically pleasing landscapes. They have
no soul. And to some extent, the interests of corporations are at
odds with the needs of humans. To the extent that humans
perform the labor that the corporations need to produce the
products they sell, the corporate incentive frequently leads the
corporation to drive down wages (in order to sell products cheaper
in the amoral marketplace).100 If that means outsourcing labor to
low-wage countries in a different part of the world or replacing
human workers with automation, the financial imperative of the
market may lead the corporation to make those choices, to the
detriment of the human workers.101
These outcomes are almost guaranteed so long as corporate
law embraces a “shareholder primacy” view of the corporation.102
In this view, the corporation exists for the benefit of its owners,
100

GREENFIELD, supra note 25, at 179.

101

Prof. Greenfield explains:
Imagine a company facing the choice of whether to close a unionized,
high-wage factory and move production to a sweatshop in a country
that has no health and safety protections for workers. Shareholders
will certainly prefer the change, all else being equal. The decrease in
labor costs will flow to the corporation’s bottom line, available for
distribution to shareholders.

Id. at 197-98.
See, e.g., Lydia Segal, Benefit Corporations: A Step Toward Reversing
Capitalism’s Crisis of Legitimacy?, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 97, 100-01 (2017).
The concept of “shareholder primacy” is often traced back to the seminal case
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), a case which one scholar
calls “the original sin” of corporate law. See GREENFIELD, supra note 25, at 3338.
102
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and the duty of the board of directors is to maximize shareholder
value. The needs of other stakeholders, including “technical
stakeholders” (customers and employees) and “institutional
stakeholders” (the environment, society at large) must be
subordinated to the needs of the shareholders.103
The relatively new concept of the “benefit corporation”
promises some relief from the negative aspects of shareholder
primacy. A benefit corporation is “required to have a purpose of
creating ‘general public benefit’ and [is] allowed to identify one or
more ‘specific public benefit’ purposes.”104 Benefit corporation
statutes redefine the fiduciary duty of the board of directors to
require consideration not only of shareholder value, but also the
impacts of their decisions on employees, customers, the
community, society at large, and the local and global
environment.105 As of January 2016, 31 states (importantly,
including Delaware) had enacted laws permitting benefit
corporations.106 However, this concept still appears to be mostly a
theoretical exercise that is gaining currency in business school
theory more so than the law.107
It is sometimes easy to lose sight of the fact that humans
created corporations to serve humans, not to exploit them.
Corporations were created to allow the accumulation of large
amounts of capital to build the industries and infrastructures
103

Segal, supra note 102, at 101-102.

William H. Clark, Jr., & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations are
Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
817, 839 (2012) (emphasis omitted). For a good discussion of why corporations
“should become more like people” and how the benefit corporation model can
help, see GREENFIELD, supra note 25, at 208-223.
104

105

Clark & Babson, supra note 104, at 839-840.

106

Segal, supra note 102, at 112.

Clark & Babson, supra note 104, at 831 (“Based on the limited case law
available, courts seem reluctant to wade into . . . issues [arising from statutes
which allow business corporations to consider interests other than the
shareholders] and often fall back on shareholder primacy.”).
107
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that were too large or cumbersome for individuals to build. Now
some of those corporations have become “too big to fail.”

IV.

Finding better metaphors

It seems clear that the notion that “corporations are people” is a
metaphor, not a legal fiction nor a metonym. It is not a legal
fiction because it is not an uncontroversial “white lie” to solve an
otherwise-intractable legal issue; 108 nor is it a metonym, because
it is not a simple word-association device.109 It is a metaphor
because the characteristics of one system (people) are being
mapped on to the new thing (the corporation). In this sense, the
metaphor serves as a magic wand to endow corporations with
rights just like the people they are being compared with. This is
the sense in which Tversky and others claim that metaphor can
replace clear thinking.110
“Money is speech” could be thought of as a metonym.111 As
a metonym it is unproblematic; money can easily be regulated
because it does not have any inherent rights. The problem arises
if “money is speech” is viewed as a metaphor: when the
characteristics of “speech” (primarily the notion that speech is
protected by the First Amendment) are metaphorically mapped
on to “money,” problems arise: speakers with more money have
more First Amendment rights than speakers with less money.
The simple solution to these problems could be to recognize
that the twin metaphors need to be replaced by more useful ones.
Thus: corporations are not people; they are tools created by people
to accomplish business goals.112 And money is not speech; it is a
108

See supra notes 50-67 and accompanying.

109

See supra notes 72-72 and accompanying text.

110

See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.

111

See discussion at supra notes 68-74.

112

I am not the first to suggest this different metaphor.
[C]orporations, not being citizens, cannot be legitimate political actors.
Like the government itself, corporations are mere tools of the citizenry,
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megaphone that can be used to amplify the speech of wealthy
corporations and individuals until that speech completely drowns
out the voices of people with less money.113

a.

Corporations are tools

The “corporations are tools” metaphor works better because tools
have specific, and limited, uses.114 You would not use a hammer
to drive a screw, for example; you need a screwdriver for that job.
You do not magically endow the hammer with the right to affix all
forms of fasteners.
The late Justice William Rehnquist recognized the danger
in giving corporations the power of political speech:
It cannot be . . . readily concluded that the right of
political expression is . . . necessary to carry out the
functions of a corporation organized for commercial
political objects rather than political subjects, to be given just as much
respect as the citizens deem useful and no more. To grant a tool a right
against the citizens who use it is a form of political idolatry that ought
to be abhorrent to any democratic regime. Rights are for people, not for
their instruments.
Greenwood, supra note 61, at 996 (footnotes omitted).
While I am not aware of any other suggestion of the metaphor “money is a
megaphone,” Judge Skelly Wright came close to this analysis when he
criticized the Buckley v. Valeo decision in his 1976 law review article. Wright,
supra note 39, at 1006. Judge Wright did not discuss whether this formulation
was a metonym or a metaphor, but he did write that there were two options for
conceptualizing campaign donations and expenditures. One would be to treat
such things as “equivalent to pure speech.” Id. The second alternative would be
“to treat political giving and spending as a form of conduct related to speech—
something roughly equivalent to the physical act of picketing or to the use of a
sound-truck.” Id. Either approach (money is pure speech, or money is conduct
akin to a sound truck), requires mapping, and thus are alternative metaphors.
113

This concept has been recognized by the Supreme Court beginning in the
era of the Founding: “A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it
. . . .” Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
114
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purposes. A State grants to a business corporation the
blessings of potentially perpetual life and limited
liability to enhance its efficiency as an economic
entity. It might reasonably be concluded that those
properties, so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose
special dangers in the political sphere. Furthermore,
it might be argued that liberties of political expression
are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes for
which States permit commercial corporations to exist.
So long as the Judicial Branches of the State and
Federal Governments remain open to protect the
corporation’s interest in its property, it has no need,
though it may have the desire, to petition the political
branches for similar protection. Indeed, the States
might reasonably fear that the corporation would use
its economic power to obtain further benefits beyond
those already bestowed.115
In response to potential objections based on the First
Amendment guarantee of free speech, Rehnquist wrote:
The free flow of information is in no way diminished
by the Commonwealth's decision to permit the
operation of business corporations with limited rights
of political expression. All natural persons, who owe
their existence to a higher sovereign than the
Commonwealth, remain as free as before to engage in
political activity.116
Note the implicit hierarchy that Rehnquist sets up here:
God created humans, and humans created corporations. Humans
cannot (or should not?) aspire to the same powers as God any

First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 825-26 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
115

116

Id. at 828.
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more than corporations should aspire to the same powers as
humans.
Rehnquist penned these words in the case of First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978). Unfortunately for advocates of
campaign finance control, he wrote them in a dissenting opinion;
the majority, in that case, granted corporations the right to spend
money opposing a ballot measure, thereby cementing the
metaphor that money is speech.117 That metaphor lives on in
more recent Supreme Court cases too.118
It appears that the Supreme Court has been blinded by the
“corporations are people” metaphor; it cannot see that a concept
which began as a legal fiction has ceased to serve justice (which is
the proper function of a legal fiction), and has instead become a
device for creating injustice. In this sense, the Supreme Court is
like the Sorcerer’s Apprentice.119 Just as Mickey tried to use
magic to endow a tool (his broom) with the powers of a human
being to carry water, the Supreme Court is attempting to endow a
different type of tool (a corporation) with the human power to
make political decisions.
But remember what happened to Mickey. He used magic to
endow the broom with the power to carry water. Satisfied with
his grant of human powers to his tool, he dozed off. The results, of
course, were disastrous, as the broom continued to carry water
Id. at 795. But cf. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258
(1986), in which the majority pointed out that
117

The resources in the treasury of a business corporation, however, are
not an indication of popular support for the corporation's political
ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of
investors and customers. The availability of these resources may make
a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of
the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 (2014) (holding that federal
limits on how much money an individual donor may contribute in total to all
political candidates violated the First Amendment).
118

119

THE SORCERER’S APPRENTICE, in FANTASIA (Walt Disney Productions 1940).
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long after the indoor well was full. All of Mickey’s efforts to
remediate the problem backfired; for example, when he tried to
chop the broom into 100 fragments, each fragment grew arms and
kept on carrying more and more water. Having lost control of the
situation, Mickey was unable to come up with any solution. This
is the situation our political system finds itself in today, as the
system has become inundated with cash from corporations and
wealthy donors, drowning out the voices of ordinary constituents.
Ultimately, of course, Mickey was rescued by the Sorcerer,
who returned in the nick of time to restore order. So, who is the
Sorcerer in our analogy? It is We the People. The Constitution,
enacted by We the People, is the supreme law of the land.
Properly understood, it can lead us out of the flawed metaphor
that corporations are people.
The “corporations are tools” metaphor works for many
purposes. Let’s return to the Santa Clara County case briefly.
That case was all about taxing fences.120 In other words, it dealt
with the property rights of the artificial entity known as a
corporation. Corporations were designed specifically to help
humans gather property and manage property rights at scale, so
using the “corporations are tools” metaphor would lead to the
same result that the “corporations are people” metaphor actually
did.121

120

See supra notes at 27-30 and accompanying text.

121

Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Bellotti, also recognizes this distinction:
There can be little doubt that when a State creates a corporation with
the power to acquire and utilize property, it necessarily and implicitly
guarantees that the corporation will not be deprived of that property
absent due process of law. Likewise, when a State charters a
corporation for the purpose of publishing a newspaper, it necessarily
assumes that the corporation is entitled to the liberty of the press
essential to the conduct of its business.

435 U.S. 765, 824 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He concludes, however,
that the right of political speech is not so “essential to the conduct” of a
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I am not arguing that corporations are inherently evil.
They are useful tools in helping us order our economic lives. They
were designed to allow us to raise large amounts of capital to do
great things (like build the transcontinental railroad). But we the
people, who created corporations to serve us, have the right to
limit those tools to their intended purposes. We should not endow
them more generally with rights that really belong just to human
beings. Corporations are not people; they are tools. And money is
not speech; it is a megaphone. Any effort to give a megaphone to
an inanimate tool is likely to end up like Mickey’s effort to save
work by endowing a broom with the power to carry water.
So let’s keep using the tool of the corporation for what it
was designed for.122 But let us prohibit their use for things they
are ill-suited to accomplish: political speech.123
corporation’s business as to deserve protection under the First Amendment. Id.
at 825.
Cf. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (“A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or
as incidental to its very existence.”).
122

Professor Greenfield has suggested that supporters of the People’s Rights
Amendment (discussed in more detail infra Part V) are trying to reconcile their
proposed amendment with corporate rights by allowing corporations to use
legal processes to protect their property (what he calls “property standing”)
and the right to derivatively assert the interests of its shareholders (what he
calls “derivative standing”). GREENFIELD, supra note 25, at 13-18. While I
agree with him that “derivative standing” is problematic since it seems to allow
disregard of the corporate form in ways that might become troublesome, id. at
18, the concept of “property standing” is consistent with the “corporation is a
tool” metaphor, since property rights (and their legal protection) are the
essence of what the corporate form is designed to accomplish.
123

Professor Greenfield argues that giving corporations limited rights of political
speech may still be necessary:
“Corporations should receive those speech rights necessary in
order to achieve their institutional and social role. That is,
corporations as a class of institutional speakers should be able to
speak on the questions that arise about that role, and individual
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There are certainly cases on the margins where simply
changing the metaphor might have unintended consequences.
The example which comes immediately to mind is the case of a
media corporation, which is in fact designed to “speak.” How can
one limit the right of The New York Times (or even, for that
matter, the Fox News Network) to speak out on political issues?
A thorough examination of this vexing question is beyond
the scope of this article.124 However, one answer might lie in the
fact that such organization have speech rights deriving from an
entirely different clause of the First Amendment, which
separately guarantees the rights of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press. Business corporations, which have no viable
claim as members of the “press,” likewise have no viable claim
that they are designed for the purpose of engaging in political
speech.
Another situation on the margins is that of corporate
criminal responsibility. If a corporation is a person, it can be
subjected to criminal liability just as a person is.125 If, however, a
corporation is merely a tool, can you convict a tool of criminal
wrongdoing? While that would seem odd, the solution may be
simple. Just as guns (which are tools) don’t kill people (people do),
corporations (another sort of tool) don’t commit crimes: its agents
corporations should be able to speak on matters that are germane
to their own business.”
Id. at 135. While there are some blurry lines suggested by his analysis, the
problem can still be resolved within the “corporations are tools” framework.
For an interesting and thorough discussion of the implications of speech and
corporate purpose, see id., at 134-170.
124

See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 49697 (1909) (holding that a statute imposing criminal sanctions upon a
corporation is constitutional). There are, of course, live questions about the
reach of certain procedural rights to corporate actors. See Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906) (holding that corporations may not assert a privilege against
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment); accord Braswell v. United
States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988).
125
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(officers, board members, employees) do. Just as the person using
the gun to kill another can in many cases be prosecuted, the
corporate agents who directed the criminal activity can be
prosecuted.126 In fact, in some situations visiting punishment on
the human actors who authorized the criminal conduct may be
preferable to punishing the entire corporation, many of whose
constituents may be innocent of any wrongdoing.

b.

Money is a megaphone

Of course, simply declaring that corporations are tools with no
political speech rights does not solve the whole problem. Simply
changing that metaphor does not prohibit the wealthy individuals
who profit from corporate activity from spending money
distributed to them from the corporation (or acquired in other
ways) to advance whatever political message or candidate they
prefer. In that case, it is not the corporation speaking at all; it is a
human being speaking with his or her own voice. But should
those human “voices” be so loud as to drown out the many smaller
voices of individuals of limited means? To what extent has the
principle of “one person, one vote”127 been replaced with “one
dollar, one vote?”
If “money is speech” is seen as a metaphor, people with
more money have more speech rights than people with less
money. Viewing money as a megaphone solves the problem.
Megaphones suggest nuisances that we are comfortable
I am well aware that this is an oversimplification of a very complex and
often controversial area of corporate and criminal law; see, e.g., W. Robert
Thomas, Incapacitating Criminal Corporations, 72 VAND. L. REV. 905 (2019);
John C. Coffee Jr., “No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick”: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981);
Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of
Corporate Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507 (2018); Samuel W. Buell, The
Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473 (2006). A full
development of this problem is beyond the scope of this Article. My point here
is simply that viewing corporations as tools does not necessarily preclude
criminal liability for the individuals who use those tools to commit crimes.
126

127

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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regulating. Judge Wright’s invocation of the “sound truck”
metaphor seems correct.128 If we can regulate sound trucks from
blaring political messages while driving around residential
neighborhoods at 2 a.m., we should also be permitted to regulate
the vast sums of money spent on political advertising that crowds
out opposing voices or points of view. Ordinary citizens don’t have
sufficient money to make their opposing voices heard, and should
not be compelled to spend their money in that way.

V.
The first step to solution: a constitutional
amendment
Changing the twin metaphors of “corporations are people” and
“money is speech” to “corporations are tools” and “money is a
megaphone” would solve the problem of corporate interference in
human politics. And Stephen Pinker’s suggestion that people can
overcome old metaphors and replace them with better ones129
gives us some hope that the new metaphors might take hold in
the law. But that remedy requires the Supreme Court to reverse
nearly 200 years130 of inexorable movement toward the current
state of legal affairs. And even if it did, there would be no
guardrail to prevent a future Court, with different personnel, to
return to the old, problematic metaphors.131 A more reliable (and
128

Wright, supra note 39, at 1006.

129

See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.

130

See generally WINKLER, supra note 1.

Sadly, but perhaps inevitably, the Supreme Court has become a political
branch of government, subject to the whims of the Presidents who appoint
Justices and the Senates which confirm them. Retired Seventh Circuit judge
Richard Posner has pointed out that, the more the Supreme Court takes on big
constitutional questions, the more it becomes a “political court”:
131

A court is supposed to be tethered to authoritative texts, such
as constitutional and statutory provisions, and to previous judicial
decisions; a legislature is not--it can roam free. But the Supreme Court,
when it is deciding constitutional cases, is political in the sense of
having and exercising discretionary power as capacious as a
legislature’s. It cannot abdicate that power, for there is nothing on
which to draw to decide constitutional cases of any novelty other than
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permanent) solution therefore would be for We the People to
enact an Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to ensure that
political rights belong only to natural human beings.132
There is a growing effort underway nationwide to do just
this. Non-profit organizations such as American Promise,133 WolfPAC,134 Free Speech for People,135 End Citizens United,136 Take
Back Our Republic,137 and others are organizing citizen-led efforts
to persuade Congress to propose an amendment to the
Constitution to declare that political rights belong to human
discretionary judgment. To such cases the constitutional text and
history, and the pronouncements in past opinions, do not speak clearly.
Such cases occupy a broad open area where the conventional legal
materials of decision run out and the Justices, deprived of those
crutches, have to make a discretionary call.
Constitutional cases in the open area are aptly regarded as
“political” because the Constitution is about politics and because cases
in the open area are not susceptible of confident evaluation on the basis
of professional legal norms. They can be decided only on the basis of a
political judgment, and a political judgment cannot be called right or
wrong by reference to legal norms.
Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31,40 (2005).
Some scholars argue that remedial measures short of a constitutional
amendment might succeed, and would be easier to accomplish. For example,
Professor Morrissey suggests that more robust disclosure requirements, or
requiring advance shareholder approval of electioneering expenditures, might
solve the problem. Morrissey, supra note 56, at 823-828. I remain skeptical,
however, that disclosure requirements would survive a Citizens United
analysis, or that shareholder approval would be effective given the extremely
weak control that shareholders actually can exercise.
132

133

AMERICAN PROMISE, www.americanpromise.net/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2019).

134

WOLF-PAC, www.wolf-pac.com/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2019).

FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, www.freespeechforpeople.org (last visited Dec.
27, 2019).
135

END CITIZENS UNITED, www.endcitizensunited.org/ (last visited Dec. 27,
2019).
136

137

TAKE BACK OUR REPUBLIC, www.takeback.org (last visited Dec. 27, 2019).
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citizens and not to corporate ones.138 As of this writing, 20 states
have called on Congress to propose such an amendment;139 five
states have called for a limited Article V convention to propose
such an amendment.140
The exact wording of what such an amendment would say
is, of course, up to whichever group (Congress or an Article V
convention of states) proposes the amendment. Efforts have
begun to propose language. For example, several bills introduced
in the 114th Congress propose different variations on the
language.141 Some of the activist groups working on the issue

Some of these groups, most notably Wolf-PAC, go one step farther and call
for a convention of states called pursuant to Article V of the Constitution for
the limited purpose of proposing that amendment, in the belief that Congress,
being captured by the monied interests, is unlikely to propose the amendment
itself. See The Solution, WOLF-PAC, www.wolf-pac.com/the_solution (last
visited Dec. 27, 2019).
138

The states that have adopted resolutions calling for an amendment to
overturn Citizens United are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Washington. State Resolutions in Support of Amending the
Constitution, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, www.freespeechforpeople.org/stateresolutions-in-support-of-amending-the-constitution/ (last visited Dec. 27,
2019). Of those states, three have done so through citizen initiative: Colorado,
Montana, and Washington. Id. The remainder have done so by resolution
adopted by the state legislature, or by letters signed by a majority of members
of the state legislature. Id.
139

The five states calling for an Article V convention to propose the
amendment are, in order of their calls: Vermont, California, Illinois, New
Jersey, and Rhode Island. The Solution, WOLF-PAC, www.wolfpac.com/the_solution (last visited Dec. 27, 2019). Note that all five of these
states are also included in the list of 19 states that have called on Congress to
propose the amendment, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, supra note 139.
140

For example, H.R.J. Res. 31, 115th Cong. (2017), which had 139 co-sponsors
in the House, proposed adding this amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
141

Section 1. To advance democratic self-government and political
equality, and to protect the integrity of government and the electoral
process, Congress and the States may regulate and set reasonable
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have also begun efforts to propose language that either Congress
or a convention might adopt.142 Regardless of how the amendment
gets proposed, three-quarters of the states (38) must then ratify
the amendment, by whatever process Congress or the convention
specifies.143
Such an amendment, if adopted, would not automatically
solve the problem, of course. It only creates space for Congress
and the state legislatures to enact meaningful campaign finance
reform, without the fear of the Supreme Court stepping in to
overrule that legislation.144 The contours of any future legislation
are therefore highly speculative at this point. However, one would
hope that future Congresses and state legislatures would be
responsive to the expressed will of a large majority of their

limits on the raising and spending of money by candidates and others
to influence elections.
Section 2. Congress and the States shall have power to
implement and enforce this article by appropriate legislation, and may
distinguish between natural persons and corporations or other
artificial entities created by law, including by prohibiting such entities
from spending money to influence elections.
Section 3. Nothing in this article shall be construed to grant
Congress or the States the power to abridge the freedom of the press.
Id. The same language was proposed on the Senate side in S.J. Res 8, and
garnered 42 co-sponsors. S.J. Res. 8, 115th Cong. (2017). Several other
resolutions proposing similar language but with far fewer co-sponsors were
also introduced. None were adopted before the session ended.
See, e.g., Writing the 28th Amendment Interactive Town Hall Series,
AMERICAN PROMISE, https://www.americanpromise.net/take-action/join-aprogram/writing-the-28th-amendment/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2019).
142

143

U.S. CONST., art. V.

The ultimate holding of Citizens United, after all, was to declare
unconstitutional the portion of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act
(commonly known as McCain-Feingold) which imposed restrictions on
corporate independent expenditures. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
371-72 (2010).
144
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human constituents that the corrupting influence of money in
politics must be eradicated.
Results from the recent mid-term elections give us hope
that this might occur. In 2018, eight states either passed by
citizens’ initiative campaign finance reform measures, or defeated
laws that would have weakened them.145 The advocacy group End
Citizens United reports that forty-eight newly-elected members of
Congress ran on platforms pledging to reject all contributions
from corporate PACs.146 And on the first day of the 116th
Congress, those newly-elected members of Congress introduced
H.R. 1, the For the People Act. The comprehensive Act says its
purpose is “[t]o expand Americans’ access to the ballot box, reduce
the influence of big money in politics, and strengthen ethics rules
for public servants, and for other purposes.”147
Perhaps we have reached a tipping point where campaign
finance (and other good-government) reforms are capturing the
imagination of voters, and meaningful reform is possible.
Thinking of corporations as tools, and money as a megaphone, can
help de-mystify these complex legal issues.

Many states pass campaign finance reform measures during midterms, THE
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/11/states-pass-campaign-financereform-18/.
145

Press Release, End Citizens United, With Last Race Called, 48 No
Corporate PAC Candidates Are Headed To Congress (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://endcitizensunited.org/press-releases/last-race-called-48-no-corporatepac-candidates-headed-congress/.
146

147

For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019).
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